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Abstract 
 
Many applications are transferred from C/S (Client/Server) mode to P2P (Peer-to-Peer) 
mode such as VoIP (Voice over IP). This paper presents a new security architecture, 
i.e. a trustworthy authentication algorithm of peers, for Session Initialize Protocol 
(SIP) based P2P computer networks. A mechanism for node authentication using a 
cryptographic primitive called one-way accumulator is proposed to secure the P2P 
SIP computer networks. It leverages the distributed nature of P2P to allow for 
distributed resource discovery and rendezvous in a SIP network, thus eliminating (or 
at least reducing) the need for centralized servers. The distributed node authentication 
algorithm is established for the P2P SIP computer networks. The corresponding 
protocol has been implemented in our P2P SIP experiment platform successfully. The 
performance study has verified the proposed distributed node authentication algorithm 
for SIP based P2P computer networks. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is one of the important topics in the research of next generation 
networks. P2P brings significant changes to the Internet. P2P applications have gained 
increasing popularity over recent years, particularly for those using Session 
Initialisation Protocol (SIP). It is regarded as the core control protocol for the next 
generation network, and is evolving from its original C/S (Client/Server) mode to P2P 
mode (Rosenberg & Schulzrinne & Camarillo & Johnston & Peterson & Sparks & 
Handley & Schooler, 2002). 
 
SIP was initially published in 2001 for establishing, changing and terminating 
sessions in IP networks. Recently, SIP has widened its applications and been used in 
multimedia conferencing, long-distance white board and instance message. SIP was 
used to simplify the connection of IPSec VPN and to combine conventional 
multimedia services with other services, such as directory information, web browsing, 
searching and tracking. As an application layer protocol, SIP is independent upon the 
actual network. Hence any types of participants in IP networks can be connected 
using SIP. For instance, SIP can provide a seamless connection between PSTN and 
GSM. This functionality would become more and more important with the 
deployment of 3G mobile networks across the world. 
 
With the expansion of SIP based applications, the C/S mode appears to have 
drawbacks that are hard to overcome. To address these problems, the SIPPING 
working group of IETF has conducted a series of research on P2P distributed mode 
for SIP computer networks. Since 2005 the group has proposed several protocols; the 
latest two are “An Architecture for Peer-to-Peer Session Initiation Protocol” (IETF 
SIPPING, 2005) and “A P2P Approach to SIP Registration and Resource Location” 
(IETF SIPPING, 2005). 
 
The latest two protocols proposed by the SIPPING group have two different P2P SIP 
architectures. The first protocol suggests a distributed SIP server to be deployed, i.e. 
the information about participants is distributed to every server in P2P mode. These 
servers communicate with each other using Distributed Hash Table (DHT) algorithms 
and all participants share and query resources in the same mode. The second draft 
takes advantage of a P2P structure, leading to the elimination of the SIP server with 
all the SIP nodes being associated in some way. The differences between the two P2P 
SIP architectures are that the former still retains some characteristics of C/S mode, but 
has a manageable advantage. The latter is a pure P2P structure as each node in the 
structure maintains its neighbour’s information and the scalability and management of 
the structure needs to be explored further. Although both protocols suggested their 
own P2P SIP architectures and application algorithms, the security problems of the 
architectures are still remained unsolved.  
 
The security of SIP based computer networks becomes a serious problem after 
transferring from C/S mode to P2P distributed mode (Singh & Schulzrinne, 2004). 
The centralized control method might solve most of security problems with the C/S 
network. However, there are more security issues to be considered in the P2P 
distributed environment, not only existing security threats to the centralized C/S 
network, but also encountering new ones in the P2P networks where nodes join and 
leave dynamically. Due to the lack of a centralized management, the P2P networks 
need extra safety approaches to ensure itself to run smoothly (Milojicic & et al, 2002). 
 
The security of the P2P SIP network involves many aspects. They are routing security, 
saving and accessing security, malicious destroy, intentional deception, user and peer 
authentication, encryption and decryption, application security and personal privacy. 
The major security problem of the P2P SIP network is peer trustworthy authentication 
when nodes join the network. 
 
This work focuses on peer trustworthy authentication (namely node authentication). A 
peer authentication solution based on a one-way accumulator is suggested in this 
paper for P2P SIP computer networks. The authentication method is adapted to P2P 
mode, and can be used to ensure the authenticity of the identity of the SIP node that is 
added to the P2P SIP network, preventing forged ones from being added to the 
network. A cryptographic primitive called one-way accumulator is also presented. 
The corresponding node authentication algorithms are established based on the 
accumulator and a node authentication protocol according to the specific 
characteristics of the P2P SIP application. Finally, the performance of the proposed 
node authentication protocol is verified in our P2P SIP experiment platform. 
 
 
Authentication for P2P SIP Computer Networks 
 Due to the essential differences between P2P mode and C/S mode, the authentication 
technologies suited to C/S mode cannot be directly applied to P2P computer networks 
(Nowell & Balakrishnan & Karger, 2002). Hence new authentication methods capable 
of adapting to the P2P networks are sought. 
 
There is no explicit difference between peer authentication and user authentication for 
SIP networks in C/S mode. Both adopt the HTTPS DEGEST authentication method 
(Rosenberg & et al, 2002). In contrast, for SIP networks in P2P mode user 
authentication is different from node authentication. User authentication performs at 
the application layer, verifying the participating user’s identity in a special SIP 
application and ultimately confirming whether the user has right to access the 
resource. Node authentication is used to ensure the reliability and security of nodes 
and to testify the authenticity and validity of the participants. In terms of the objects 
being encrypted, the two authentication methods have some similarity. For example, 
both run in the same way that one part (or multiple parts) validates the identity of the 
other part (or other multiple parts). As existing methods can be directly adopted to 
solve the security problems associated with the user authentication for P2P SIP 
networks, this study is mainly focused on node authentication for the networks. 
 
One approach to node authentication is the legal node identification technology using 
the global list of the legal nodes in P2P SIP networks. When a node needs to validate 
the identity of its peer, the identification list of legal nodes can be queried (Nowell & 
Balakrishnan & Karger, 2002; Lennox & Schulzrinne, 2003; Xiong & Liu, 2004). The 
shortcomings of this centralized authentication method include complex management, 
un-scalability, and single node’s failure. 
 
Node authentication based on the encryption technology has more virtues than the 
legal node identification technology mentioned above (Xiong & Liu, 2004). The 
digital signature using encryption is the major method of implementing node 
authentication. The basic idea is to validate the node’s identity through its digital 
certificate issued by the authorized organization. This can be achieved on the Internet. 
The node participating safe communication applies a digital certificate from the 
authorized organization, e.g. Certificate Authority (CA), which is responsible for 
issuing digital certificates. The credibility of the node can then be ensured by the 
authorized organization. In the communication process, the node provides its own 
certificate when its identity needs to be validated making its peer to know its identity. 
 
The node authentication using digital certificates has derived from the centralized CA 
technology. It is convenient to inosculate with the existing information security 
technology. It can be used for small- or medium-scale P2P networks. However it is 
not appropriate for large-scale P2P computer networks (Camenish & Lysyanskaya, 
2002). On the one hand, there should not be a central controlling node in the P2P 
networks. On the other hand, the centralized CA does not conform to the distributing 
character of the P2P networks. 
 
The distributed CA technology, attempting to divide the function of the traditional 
centralized CA into several distributed nodes, was proposed to solve the single node’s 
failure problem with the traditional CA technology (Lennox & Schulzrinne, 2003; 
Xiong & Liu, 2004). With the technology all nodes collaborate on issuing the user’s 
certificate with their own shares of the CA private key. The users applying for 
certificates receive only the fragments of the digital certificates issued by these nodes, 
and the whole certificates can then be obtained through computing (the computing is 
performed by the node itself or with the help of the third party). The distributed CA 
technology not only needs the correlative infrastructure of key management (e.g. key 
distributing and key deleting) but also involves the management of certificates such as 
certificate withdrawing, certificate renewing etc. 
 
A new node authentication method is proposed based on a one-way accumulator for 
P2P SIP networks, leveraging the distributed nature of P2P to allow for distributed 
resource discovery and rendezvous in a SIP network, and eliminating (or at least 
reducing) the need for centralized servers. 
 
 
Proposed Node Authentication Based on a One-way Accumulator 
 
The main objective of this study is to propose a new mechanism for node 
authentication using a cryptographic primitive called one-way accumulator.  This 
section is to detail how to construct the one-way accumulator and the basic ideas of 
the node authentication. 
  
Basic Principle 
 
According to the correlative theory of cryptology, the one-way Hash function that 
meets the half-exchange law has the following characteristics (Bnaloh & Dde Mare, 
1994): 
o The one-way characteristic of the Hash function signifies that it is easy to 
compute in a certain way but it is very difficult to compute in other ways. 
o Half-exchange law means, on condition seeds being given, the result of the 
accumulator keeps invariable when it is computed in different orders. 
 
On the basis of the two characteristics, a one-way accumulator is suggested in this 
study to validate whether an appointed value belongs to the corresponding set of 
nodes, and a special authentication scheme is designed to meet the requirements of 
node authentication for P2P SIP computer networks. The basic principle is 
summarized below. 
 
Firstly, each node in P2P SIP networks is assigned a number i and a uniquely 
correlated private key yi. All nodes should submit their own values of (i, yi) to an 
appointed authentication node, i.e. a bootstrap node in the P2P SIP networks. 
 
Secondly, having received all nodes’ values of (i, yi), the appointed node, i.e. the 
bootstrap node, takes use of the one-way accumulator to calculate the total 
accumulative value z for all the nodes and the corresponding partial accumulative 
values of (i, zi) for each node. The appointed node then sends the partial accumulative 
values to the corresponding nodes, and distributes / publishes the total accumulative 
value z to all the nodes in the networks. 
 
Thirdly, the node j is used to validate the identity of its peer, e.g. the node i that 
intends to establish a connection with it. After the peer node i submitting its own 
value of (yi, zi) to the node j, the node j then calculates the Hash value z’ = h(yi, zi) and 
determines whether z’ equals the total accumulative value z. If z’ is equal to z, the 
node i passes validation; otherwise, the node i fails authentication. 
 
The characteristics of the one-way accumulator determine the security and credibility 
of node authentication, so constructing the one-way accumulator is the core step in the 
design of the authentication protocol. The one-way accumulator should not only 
ensure the simplicity of validation computing, but also guarantee there is no 
contradiction between the final results. 
 
The unique identity of the node in P2P SIP networks described by the value (i, yi) is 
the warrant of the node’s routing communication. So the most important aspect of the 
node authentication algorithm is to ensure the uniqueness of the legal node’s identity. 
This can be achieved by using the private key distribution method, which is discussed 
in details in another paper. 
 
The anti-forgery of authentication information requires that nodes in P2P SIP 
networks cannot forge other nodes’ authentication information, and cannot destroy the 
uniqueness of the nodes. It could prevent nodes from spoofing credentials or repaying 
attacks. Thus a Challenge-Response mechanism based on a random number will be 
introduced in the proposed node authentication algorithm to prevent forging (Maricn 
& Piftzmann, 1997). 
 
One-way Accumulator Based Node Authentication Algorithm  
 
Constructing a one-way accumulator is the major task of designing the node 
authentication algorithm for P2P SIP networks. Equation (1) is proposed as a one-way 
accumulator based on an exponent. It has been proved to be the one-way function that 
has the characteristics of accumulators (Michael & Goodrich & Tamaassia & Hasic, 
2002; Mukherjee, 2006). 
 niYynxznxz iyyyy i ,...2,1,,modmod .... 21     (1) 
where n is an integer. 
 
To establish the node authentication algorithm based on equation (1), the following 
procedures are performed: 
 
Step 1: a random integer generator RANDOM() generates an integer m; 
 
Step 2: the function PRIME(m) capable of selecting a prime number is used to choose 
a big enough prime number n from the set of [1 ,…, m] as follows: 
)1(*)1()(,*  qpnandqpn        (2) 
where (n)  is the Euler number, p and q are prime numbers, and p != q. 
 
Step 3: the accumulative value z is calculated by using equation (3). 
  nxniYynxz yi Yyiyyy mod,...2,1,,mod.... 21       (3) 
 
Step 4: the partial accumulative value of the node j is calculated by using equation (4). 
In fact, each node can compute its partial accumulative value zj after receiving the 
accumulative value z. 
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Step 5: equation (5) is used for node authentication. If p equals 1, the node j is legal 
and passes authentication; otherwise, node authentication fails. 
 0:1?mod nzzp jyj        (5) 
To reduce the expense of calculating the accumulative value z, equation (6) is then 
suggested to compute the accumulative value z when a new node j is added to the P2P 
SIP network. 
nzz jyj mod          (6) 
 
P2P SIP computer networks are dynamical and self-organized networks in which 
nodes can join and leave randomly. When a node is added or deleted, the boot node 
must update the corresponding information about all the nodes in the networks, such 
as re-calculating the accumulative value z and the partial accumulative values zi for 
each node. So the node authentication protocol based on the one-way accumulator 
suggested above should include four stages, protocol initiation, node adding, node 
deleting and node authentication. The details are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
Design of a Node Authentication Protocol for P2P SIP Computer Networks 
 
Based on the one-way accumulator constructed by the method presented above, a 
node authentication protocol is then suggested in this section for P2P SIP computer 
networks. 
 
Architecture of P2P SIP Computer Networks 
  
According to a draft, “A P2P Approach to SIP Registration and Resource Location” 
suggested by SIPPING (IETF SIPPING, 2005), a hierarchical P2P SIP architecture is 
proposed here, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1: The architecture of a P2P SIP network 
 
In this architecture, the whole P2P SIP network is divided into many groups. Within a 
group, a super node (SN), e.g. node 2 in Figure 1, is used to store the routing 
information of other ordinary nodes (ONs), and the ordinary nodes query their 
neighbours through the SN. This is the first layer of the hierarchical architecture. The 
second layer consists of all the SN groups in the network. Between groups, a super 
node routes a message to another SN using P2P algorithms called Distributed Hash 
Tables (DHTs) that support efficient search mechanisms when resource names are 
precisely known. The proposed hierarchical architecture for P2P SIP computer 
networks has a number of advantages, including: 
o It would reduce significantly the average number of hops in a lookup, particularly 
when nodes are heterogeneous. 
o It would cut down the lookup latency when the peers in the same group are 
topologically close and cooperative caching is used within the group. 
o It facilitates the large-scale deployment of the P2P lookup. 
 
The key feature of the P2P SIP architecture (Fig. 1) compared with SIP in C/S mode 
is that it has no dedicated server or proxy (IETF SIPPING, 2005). The nodes 
participating in the overlay not only act as traditional SIP User Agents (UA), allowing 
their users to place and receive calls, but also play the roles of registrars and proxies 
in SIP networks when being viewed collectively with other peers. These roles include 
resource location, maintaining information, and call routing. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Extension to the node REGISTER messaging 
 
The semantics of standard SIP messaging is preserved to a great extent as possible in 
order to implement the node authentication protocol on P2P SIP networks. All the 
messages that maintain DHTs and are required to query information are implemented 
using SIP messaging. The SIP REGISTER messaging is extended here to look up 
resources. It includes maintaining DHTs, such as the messages that are joined or left 
the overlay network, and information transferred between nodes. So the extended 
REGISTER messaging has two functions, one is to accomplish node registration and 
validate newly joined nodes (see Figure 2 for the REGISTER message format in this 
situation); another function is to implement the resource registration before the 
session is invited, and the REGISTER messaging has no contact information, but 
resource IDs. 
 
A new header parameter, Key, is introduced in the node REGISTER messaging as 
shown in Figure 2. It is used to inform the peer about its authentication number yi 
(private) and the partial accumulative value zi with both parameters being encrypted. 
 
 
Fig. 3: The signalling process of a P2P SIP network 
 
Consequently, the REGISTER messaging has various functions at different states for 
P2P SIP networks, and the whole signalling process of the P2P SIP networks is shown 
in Figure 3. The first REGISTER message is used to accomplish node registration; 
similarly, the second and the third are also used for node registration. But the seventh 
and ninth REGISTER messages are used to perform user registration. Having 
completed user registration, a node sends an INVITE message, e.g. the 15th message, 
to initiate a session with its peer. Among these messages, the node registration 
message, REGISTER, has the information of node authentication. 
 
 
Assign a modulus n
Compute two big primes  q & p, n = p*q
Calculates z , z = x0y1 mod n
Compute the Euler number  (n) = (p-1)(q-1)
Assign a seed x0, gcd(x0, (n)) = 1
Assign a node IDy1, y1Є z (private)
 
 
Fig. 4: The process of the initialization stage 
 
 Details of the Node Authentication Protocol 
 
The node authentication protocol based on the proposed one-way accumulator in the 
preceding section can be divided into four stages, initialization stage, node adding 
stage, node deleting stage and node authentication stage. 
 
Initialization stage 
 
The initiation process of the protocol is shown in Figure 4. At this stage, some 
parameters such as (n), p, q and y1 are introduced, in order to accomplish the 
parameter initialization of the authentication protocol. 
 
Node adding stage 
 
Figure 5 shows the process of the node adding stage. Provided that there are not many 
nodes in the P2 SIP computer network, for example, the total node number is less than 
100, all nodes in the network are regards as one group. The bootstrap node in the 
network is responsible for calculating the total accumulative value z. Other nodes in 
the P2P SIP network then calculate their own partial accumulative values (zi) after 
receiving the accumulative value broadcasted by the bootstrap node. 
 
Assign a big number yi as a node own ID
Added node sends yi to SN by REGISTER
SN calculates z by using (6) and broadcasts z
Ordinary nodes calculate their own zj by using (4)  
 
Fig. 5: The process of the node adding stage 
 
Whereas, if there are more than 100 nodes in the P2P SIP network, the nodes in the 
network are divided into groups in order to improve the efficiency of node 
authentication. As a result, a super node (SN) is chosen for each group. The firstly 
added node of a group is acted as a temporary SN; with more nodes added to the 
group, the super node of the group is then selected according to the SN selection 
algorithm (Liu & Huang & Li, 2008). The computation of the accumulative value is 
accomplished by the super node, and ordinary nodes in the group calculate their own 
partial accumulative values after receiving the accumulative value broadcasted by the 
SN. 
 
Node deleting stage 
 
Having been added into the P2P SIP network, a new node should send periodically a 
REGISTER message to the bootstrap node or the super node. Note that the interval 
between two REGISTER messages can be adjusted in terms of the node number in a 
P2P network. Meanwhile, if the node number in the P2P network is too large, then the 
nodes in the network should be divided into multi-groups in order to decrease the load 
on the super node. This issue is discussed in detail in the following section. Otherwise, 
the bootstrap node or the SN will delete the ID of the new node from the node list, 
and update the z and zj values by using equations (3) and (4). The bootstrap node or 
the SN is responsible for computing the new accumulative value and broadcasting it 
to ordinary nodes, which compute their own partial accumulative values once a node 
has been removed. 
 
Node authentication stage 
 
The process of node authentication is shown in Figure 6. If a node intends to establish 
a connection with its peer according to the best peer selection algorithm, it must pass 
the authentication by its peer first. Only if the authentication is successful, the node 
can then establish a connection with its peer by using the node REGISTER messaging 
as shown in Figure 2. Otherwise, the link cannot be established.  
 
If the nodes in the P2P SIP network are divided into groups, the super nodes of the 
groups are required to perform node authentication using the authentication protocol. 
As long as a node passed node authentication, it may be regarded as a trustworthy 
super node by other ordinary nodes within the group. 
 
Node authenticated shows its (yi, zi) by REGISTER
Node authenticated computes z’ by using (3)
Authentication success
User registration
z = z’ ? Authenticationfailure
N
Y
 
 
Fig. 6: The process of the node authentication stage 
 
 
Evaluation of the Proposed Node Authentication Protocol 
  
As the bootstrap node or the super node computes the accumulative value for all the 
nodes in P2P SIP networks, the performance of the node authentication protocol is 
dependent upon two factors. One is the hardware configuration of the bootstrap or the 
super node. The other is the complexity of the authentication protocol. It also depends 
largely on the complexity of the one-way accumulator on which the authentication 
protocol is based. 
  
Table 1 lists the performance results for the complexity of the node authentication 
protocol described in the preceding section. In Table 1, the complexity of 
communication denotes the time of exchanging message. For example, O(2) means it 
needs to exchange two messages for a node to be validated. The complexity of 
computation indicates the time of an exponent operation, e.g. O(1) denoting two 
executions of the exponent operation. 
 
Table 1:  Complexity of the node authentication protocol 
 
Operation Complexity 
Communication SN Computing ON Computing 
Node added O(m) O(1) O(1|) 
Node deleted O(m) O(1) O(1) 
Node validated O(2) O(0) O(1|) 
 
 
The proposed node authentication protocol is simulated in our experiment platform 
with a piece of streaming media playing software being implemented on a P2P SIP 
network (Figure 7) (Liu & Huang & Li, 2008). The software, deployed on the 
CERNET2 network, is used to play on-demand TV and streaming media. The nodes 
in the P2P SIP network are divided into groups. Each group consists of the nodes that 
play the same streaming media program. A node must pass authentication before it 
can join the appointed group. 
 
 Fig. 7: A streaming media playing software on a P2P SIP network 
 
To assess the performance of the node authentication protocol, some groups are 
organized in a way that they had different numbers of nodes ranging from 10 to 100 
nodes. These nodes are configured with Intel duo core CPU, 1GB memory and 
windows XP. All applications support IPv6. 
 
The delay times of adding a node, deleting a node and validating a node are measured 
respectively on our experiment platform, and the experimental results for the delay 
times are shown in Figure 8. The delay time of adding a node is the time spent by the 
bootstrap node to compute the accumulative value when a node joins the P2P SIP 
network. Similarity, the delay time of deleting a node is the time required by the 
bootstrap node for computing the accumulative value in the case of node deletion. The 
delay time of validating a node is the time taken by a node to validate the identity of 
its peer.  All the three types of delay times include the communication delay, which is 
the time necessary for receiving and sending messages. 
 
The results in Table 1 and Figure 8 show that the authentication algorithm is a 
validating symmetry, which means the computing and communication overhead of 
each node in the SIP P2P network are almost equal. Symmetry requires that node 
authentication is totally distributed and no node should bear more responsibility than 
others. The symmetry characteristic meets the distribution requirement of P2P 
networks. The delay times of validating a node demonstrate the authentication 
algorithm has an excellent symmetry. The delay times of adding a node and deleting a 
node have some slight varieties when the node number increases, which is due to the 
increasing overhead of communication while the overhead of computation is steady. 
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Fig. 8: The delay time of the authentication algorithm 
 
The findings also reveal that the authentication algorithm has a high stability. As a 
dynamical and self-organized network, the P2P SIP network allows nodes to join or 
leave the network freely. So the node authentication algorithm needs to ensure the 
stability of the authentication overhead when the node number of the network varies 
frequently. The authentication overhead includes both the communication delay and 
the computing delay. As shown in Figure 8, the delay times of validating a node are 
almost constant despite the node number changes. In addition, the delay times of 
adding a node and deleting a node increase slightly when the node number increases 
from 10 to 100. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
By analysing the differences between P2P (Peer-to-Peer) computing mode and 
traditional C/S (Client/Server) mode for SIP computer networks, the significance of 
node authentication in P2P over SIP computer networks has been emphasized by this 
study.  
 
A mechanism for node authentication using a cryptographic primitive called one-way 
accumulator is proposed and presented in this paper to solve the node authentication 
for P2P SIP computer networks. 
 
The performance study carried out on our P2P SIP experimental platform has proved 
that the proposed node authentication algorithm based on a one-way accumulator has 
been implemented on a P2P SIP network successfully. The test results indicate the 
proposed protocol has a high reliability and safety. 
 
The further work of research is to design a better one-way accumulator, simplifying 
the procedures of node authentication for P2P SIP computer networks. 
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